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Abstract
Several relaxations of envy-freeness, tailored to fair division in settings with indivisible
goods, have been introduced within the last decade. Due to the lack of general existence
results for most of these concepts, great attention has been paid to establishing approxi-
mation guarantees. In this work, we propose a simple algorithm that is universally fair in
the sense that it returns allocations that have good approximation guarantees with respect
to four such fairness notions at once. In particular, this is the first algorithm achieving
a (φ − 1)-approximation of envy-freeness up to any good (efx) and a 2φ+2 -approximation of
groupwise maximin share fairness (gmms), where φ is the golden ratio (φ ≈ 1.618). The best
known approximation factor for either one of these fairness notions prior to our work was
1/2. Moreover, the returned allocation achieves envy-freeness up to one good (ef1) and a 2/3-
approximation of pairwise maximin share fairness (pmms). While efx is our primary focus,
we also exhibit how to fine-tune our algorithm and improve the guarantees for gmms or
pmms.
Finally, we show that gmms—and thus pmms and efx—allocations always exist when
the number of goods does not exceed the number of agents by more than two.
1 Introduction
The mathematical study of fair division has a long and intriguing history, starting with the
formal introduction of the cake-cutting problem by Banach, Knaster and Steinhaus [Steinhaus,
1948]. Ever since, we have seen the emergence of several fairness criteria, such as the classic
notion of envy-freeness, that has a dominant role in the literature, see e.g., Brams and Taylor
[1996], Moulin [2003], Robertson and Webb [1998], Brandt et al. [2016].
On the other hand, the computational study of finding fair allocations when the resources
are indivisible items is more recent. It is motivated by the realization that envy-freeness and
other classic fairness notions are too demanding for the discrete setting. In particular, even
with two agents and one item, it is impossible to produce an allocation with any reasonable
worst-case approximation guarantee with respect to envy-freeness.
Within the last decade, these considerations have led to natural relaxations of envy-freeness,
which are more suitable for the context of indivisible goods. The most prominent examples,
that are also the focus of our work, include the notions of envy-freeness up to one good (ef1)
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and up to any good (efx), maximin share fairness (mms), as well as pairwise and group-
wise maximin share fairness (pmms and gmms respectively). These relatively new concepts
breathed new life into the field of fair division, but they do not come without their issues.
Most importantly, although they are generally easier to satisfy than envy-freeness, proving ex-
istence results has turned out to be a very challenging task (with the exception of ef1). For
instance, it is an open problem to resolve whether efx or pmms allocations always exist, even
for three agents with additive valuation functions. Surprisingly, existence remains unresolved
even when the number of items is just slightly larger than the number of agents.
A reasonable approach is to focus on approximate versions of these relaxations. Indeed,
this has led to a series of positive results, obtaining constant factor approximation algorithms
for all the aforementioned relaxed criteria (see Related Work). However, improving on the
currently known factors seems to be approaching a stagnation point. For example, soon after
the introduction of efx, a 1/2-approximation was established [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018],
but there has been no progress beyond 1/2, despite the active interest on this notion.
We should also stress that these notions capture quite different aspects of fairness. As
shown by Amanatidis et al. [2018], a good approximation of any one of ef1, efx, mms and
pmms does not necessarily imply particularly strong guarantees for any of the others. Hence,
it becomes compelling to ask for allocations that attain good guarantees with respect to several
fairness notions simultaneously. Such results are rather scarce in the literature, e.g., [Barman
et al., 2018a] or are purely existential [Caragiannis et al., 2016].
Motivated by the lack of such universally fair algorithms, we look at the problem of comput-
ing allocations that (approximately) satisfy several fairness notions at the same time. Along the
way, we aim to improve the state-of-the-art for two of these notions, namely efx and gmms.
Somewhat unexpectedly, to do so we rely on simple subroutines that have been repeatedly
used in fair division before.
Contribution. Our main contribution is an algorithm that is universally fair, in the sense that
it achieves a better than 1/2-approximation for all the notions under consideration. The main
results can be summarized in the following statement.
Main Theorem (Informal). We can efficiently compute an allocation that is simultaneously
i) efx up to a factor of 0.618,
ii) gmms up to a factor of 0.553 (thus, ditto for mms),
iii) ef1, and
iv) pmms up to a factor of 0.667.
We view parts i) and ii) of breaking the 1/2-approximation barrier for efx and gmms, as
the highlights of this work. These desirable properties are attained by Algorithm 3 (Section
3). We also suggest variations with improved guarantees for one notion at the expense of the
others. The factors achieved by Algorithm 3 and its variants, compared against the state of the
art for each notion, are shown in Table 1.
efx ef1 gmms pmms
Best known 0.5 1 0.5 0.781
Algorithm 3 0.618 1 0.553 0.667
Variant in Thm. 15 0.6 1 0.571 0.667
Variant in Thm. 17 0.618 0.894 0.553 0.717
Table 1: Summary of our results and state of the art. Known results in the first row are due to Plaut and
Roughgarden [2018], Lipton et al. [2004], Barman et al. [2018a], and Kurokawa [2017], respectively.
At a technical level, our results aremaking use of two algorithms that are known to produce
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only ef1 allocations. The first one is a simple draft algorithm and the second one is the envy-
cycle-elimination algorithm of Lipton et al. [2004]. Although these algorithms on their own
do not possess any good approximations with respect to efx or gmms, our main insight is that
by carefully combining parametric versions of these algorithms, we can obtain approximation
guarantees for all the fairness criteria of interest here.
In Section 5, we return to the intriguing issue of existence. We show that gmms—and thus
pmms and efx—allocations always exist, and can be found efficiently, when the number of
goods does not exceed the number of agents by more than two. While this is a simple case, it
is still non-trivial to tackle and has remained unresolved. Quite surprisingly, the idea of envy
cycle elimination again comes to the rescue, after we carefully alter a small part of the instance.
Related work. Envy-freeness was initially suggested by Gamow and Stern [1958], and more
formally by Foley [1967] and Varian [1974]. Regarding the relaxations of envy-freeness, ef1
was defined by Budish [2011], but it was also implicit in the work of Lipton et al. [2004]. Bud-
ish also defined the notion of maximin shares, based on concepts by Moulin [1990]. Later on,
Caragiannis et al. [2016] introduced the notions of efx and pmms, and even more recently, Bar-
man et al. [2018a] proposed to study gmms allocations. Further variants and generalizations
of the criteria we present here have also been considered, see e.g., Suksompong [2018].
ef1 allocations are known to be efficiently computable by the envy-cycle-elimination al-
gorithm of Lipton et al. [2004]. For all other notions, the focus has been on approximation
algorithms since existence is either not guaranteed or is still an open problem. The most well
studied notion is mms with a series of positive results [Amanatidis et al., 2017b, Kurokawa
et al., 2018, Barman and Murthy, 2017, Garg et al., 2019], and a known 3/4-approximation
[Ghodsi et al., 2018]. Exact and approximate efx allocations with both additive and general
valuations were studied by Plaut and Roughgarden [2018], achieving the currently best 1/2-
approximation. Recently, a polynomial time algorithm with the same guarantee has been ob-
tained by Chan et al. [2019]. The same factor is also the best known for gmms allocations
by Barman et al. [2018a] via a variant of envy cycle elimination. Finally, the currently best
approximation of 0.781 for pmms is due to Kurokawa [2017], using an approach similar to
ours. Connections between the approximate versions of these criteria have been investigated
by Amanatidis et al. [2018]; see Appendix B for a comparison of these implications with our
results.
Some of these fairness criteria have also been studied in combination with other objectives,
such as Pareto optimality [Barman et al., 2018b], truthfulness [Amanatidis et al., 2016, 2017a]
or maximizing the Nash welfare [Caragiannis et al., 2016, 2019, Chaudhury et al., 2019].
In the latter recent manuscript, at the same time and independently of our work, Chaud-
hury et al. [2019] also improve the 1/2 factor for gmms. In particular, they, too, follow closely
the proof of Proposition 3.4 of Amanatidis et al. [2018] to obtain a 4/7-approximation algo-
rithm. This matches the guarantee of our Theorem 15.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1,2, . . . ,n} be a set of n agents andM be a set of m indivisible items. Unless otherwise
stated, we assume that each agent is associated with a monotone, additive valuation function,
i.e., for S ⊆M , vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi({g}). For simplicity, we write vi(g) instead of vi({g}), for g ∈ M .
Monotonicity in this additive setting is equivalent to all items being goods, i.e., vi(g) ≥ 0 for
every i ∈ N,g ∈ M . For the algorithms presented in this work, we assume that their input
contains the valuation function of each involved agent, i.e., vi(g) is given to the algorithm for
every agent i and good g .
We consider the most standard setting in fair division, where we want to allocate all the
goods to the agents (no free disposal). An allocation ofM to the n agents is therefore a partition,
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A = (A1, . . . ,An), where Ai ∩Aj = ∅ and ∪iAi =M . By Πn(M) we denote the set of all partitions
of a setM into n bundles.
Although we allow for multiple goods to have the exact same value for a specific agent,
we assume a deterministic tie-breaking rule for the goods (e.g., break ties lexicographically).
This way we may abuse the notation and write g = argmaxh∈M vi(h) instead of “let g be the
lexicographically first element of argmaxh∈M vi(h)”.
2.1 Fairness Concepts
All the fairness notions we work with are relaxations of the classic notion of envy-freeness.
Definition 1. An allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) is envy-free (ef), if for every i, j ∈N , vi(Ai ) ≥ vi(Aj ).
As envy-freeness is too strong to ask for, when we deal with indivisible goods, several
relaxed fairness notions have been introduced so as to obtain meaningful positive results. We
start with two additive relaxations, and their approximate versions, where an agent may envy
another agent, but only by an amount dependent on the value of a single good in the other
agent’s bundle.
Definition 2. An allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) is an
a) α-ef1 allocation (α-envy-free up to one good), if for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N , with Aj , ∅,
there exists a good g ∈ Aj , such that vi(Ai ) ≥ α · vi(Aj \ {g}).
b) α-efx allocation (α-envy-free up to any good), if for every pair i, j ∈ N , with Aj , ∅ and every
good g ∈ Aj , it holds that vi(Ai ) ≥ α · vi(Aj \ {g}).1
Of course, for α = 1 we obtain precisely the notions of envy-freeness up to one good (ef1)
[Budish, 2011] and envy-freeness up to any good (efx) [Caragiannis et al., 2016]. It is easy to
see that ef implies efx, which in turn implies ef1.
On a different direction, an interesting family of fairness criteria has been developed around
the notion ofmaximin shares, also proposed by Budish [2011]. The idea behindmaximin shares
is to capture the worst-case guarantees of generalizing the famous cut-and-choose protocol to
multiple agents: Suppose agent i is asked to partition the goods into n bundles, while knowing
that the other agents will choose a bundle before her. In the worst case, she will be left with her
least valuable bundle. Assuming that agents are risk-averse, agent i would choose a partition
that maximizes the minimum value of a bundle. This gives rise to the following definition.
Definition 3. Given n agents, and a subset S ⊆ M of goods, the n-maximin share of agent i with
respect to S is:
µi(n,S) = maxA∈Πn(S)
min
Aj∈A
vi(Aj ) .
From the definition, it directly follows that n ·µi(n,S) ≤ vi(S). When S =M , this quantity is
just called the maximin share of agent i. We say that T ∈Πn(M) is an n-maximin share defining
partition for agent i, if minTj∈T vi(Tj ) = µi (n,M). When it is clear from context what n and M
are, we simply write µi instead of µi(n,M).
The most popular fairness notion based on maximin shares, referred to as maximin share
fairness, asks for a partition that gives each agent her (approximate) maximin share.
Definition 4. An allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) is called an α-mms (α-maximin share) allocation if
vi(Ai) ≥ α ·µi , for every i ∈N .
1 The original definition required the condition to hold for all g ∈ Aj with vi (g) > 0. This is often dropped in
the literature, under the assumption that all values are positive [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018, Caragiannis et al.,
2019]. For our work neither assumption is needed.
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Variations of maximin share fairness have also been proposed. Here we focus on two no-
table examples. The first one, pairwise maximin share fairness, is related but not directly com-
parable to mms and was introduced by Caragiannis et al. [2016]. The idea is to demand an
mms-type guarantee but for any pair of agents. That is, we can think of an agent i as consid-
ering the combined bundle of herself and another agent and requesting to receive at least her
maximin share of this bundle if split into two subsets.
Definition 5. An allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) is called an α-pmms (α-pairwise maximin share)
allocation if for every pair of agents i, j ∈N , vi(Ai) ≥ α ·µi(2,Ai ∪Aj ).
Taking this one step further, we can demand an allocation to have an mms-type guarantee
for any subset of agents. This is referred to as groupwise maximin share fairness, introduced by
Barman et al. [2018a].
Definition 6. An allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) is called an α-gmms (α-groupwise maximin share)
allocation if for every subset of agents N ′ ⊆N and any agent i ∈N ′, vi(Ai ) ≥ α ·µi(|N ′ |,∪j∈N ′Aj ).
In Definitions 4, 5, and 6, when α = 1, we refer to the corresponding allocations as mms,
pmms, and gmms allocations respectively. It is clear that the notion of gmms is stronger than
both mms and pmms. Further, it has been observed that ef is stronger than gmms [Barman
et al., 2018a] and, when all values are positive, pmms is stronger than efx [Caragiannis et al.,
2016]. It should be noted, however, that the approximate versions of all these notions are
related in non-straightforward ways [Amanatidis et al., 2018].
An example illustrating all the fairness notions defined above can be found in Appendix
A.
2.2 Known EF1 Algorithms
Among the fairness notions defined above, ef1 is the only one for which we know that it can
always be achieved. Furthermore, two simple algorithms are already known for computing
such allocations in polynomial time. We state below a parametric version of these algorithms
so that they can run for a limited number of steps or on a strict subset of the goods, as we are
going to use them later as subroutines.
In order to define the envy-cycle-elimination algorithm (Algorithm 1) of Lipton et al. [2004],
we first need to introduce the notion of an envy graph. Suppose we have a partial allocation
P = (P1, . . . ,Pn), i.e., an allocation of a strict subset of M . We define the directed envy graph
GP = (N,EP ), where (i, j) ∈ EP if and only if agent i currently envies agent j, i.e., vi(Pi) < vi(Pj ).
Algorithm 1 builds an allocation one good at a time; in each step, an agent that no one envies
receives the next available good. To ensure that such an agent always exists, the algorithm
identifies cycles that are created in the envy graph and eliminates them by appropriately real-
locating some of the current bundles.
Regarding tie-breaking in line 10 of the algorithm, we assume that agent i is the lexico-
graphically first node ofGP with in-degree 0. Belowwe summarize the main known properties
of Algorithm 1 that we will utilize in our analysis.
Theorem 7 (Follows by Lipton et al. [2004]). Let P be any ef1 partial allocation and M ′ = M
∪ni=1Pi . Then,
a) at the end of each iteration of the for loop, the resulting partial allocation is ef1. Hence, the
algorithm terminates with an ef1 allocation in polynomial time. This holds even for agents with
general monotone valuation functions.
b) Fix an agent i, and let Ai be the bundle assigned to i at the end of some iteration of the for loop.
If A′i is assigned to i at the end of a future iteration, then vi(A
′
i ) ≥ vi(Ai).
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Algorithm 1: Envy-Cycle-Elimination(N,P ,M ′)
where N : set of agents, P : initial partial allocation,M ′: set of unallocated goods
1 Construct the envy graph GP
2 for every g ∈M ′ in lexicographic order do
3 while there is no node of in-degree 0 in GP do
4 Find a cycle j1 → j2 → . . .→ jr → j1 in GP
5 B = Pj1
6 for k = 1 to r − 1 do
7 Pjk = Pjk+1 /* shift the bundles */
8 Pjr = B
9 Update GP
10 Let i ∈N be a node of in-degree 0
11 Pi = Pi ∪ {g}
12 Update GP
13 return P
The first property of Theorem 7 simply says that the ef1 property is maintained during
the execution of the algorithm, given an initial ef1 allocation. The second property states that
agents only get happier throughout the course of the algorithm, since they keep getting better
and better bundles.
For additive valuation functions there is, in fact, an even simpler greedy algorithm, referred
to in the literature as the round-robin algorithm, or the draft algorithm (Algorithm 2) that also
outputs ef1 allocations, see e.g., Markakis [2017]. Given a fixed ordering of the agents, they
simply pick their favorite unallocated good one by one, according to that ordering, until there
are no goods left.
Algorithm 2: Round-Robin(N,P ,M ′, ℓ,τ)
where N : set of agents, P : partial allocation, M ′: set of unallocated goods, ℓ: an ordering of N , τ:
number of steps
1 k = 1
2 whileM ′ , ∅ and τ > 0 do
3 g = argmaxh∈M ′ vℓ[k](h)
4 Pℓ[k] = Pℓ[k] ∪ {g}
5 M ′ =M ′ {g}
6 k = k +1 mod n
7 τ = τ − 1
8 return (P ,M ′)
Theorem 8. Let ℓ be any ordering of N and P∅ = (∅, . . . ,∅). Then Algorithm 2 with input (N,P∅,
M,ℓ, |M |) produces an ef1 allocation in polynomial time.
3 A Simple Universally Fair Algorithm
As mentioned above, Algorithm 3 is built on Algorithms 1 and 2. In particular, it first runs
a simple preprocessing step (Algorithm 4) that determines an appropriate ordering ℓ of the
set of agents N . Then, it suffices to run only two rounds of the round-robin algorithm, once
with respect to ℓ and once with respect to the reverse of ℓ (the second run is also restricted to
6
a subset of the agents), and finally run the envy-cycle-elimination algorithm on the remaining
instance. It should be noted here that the preprocessing step is mostly introduced to facilitate
the presentation and the analysis of the algorithm. As it can be seen by its description, Algo-
rithm 4 could be combined with the first run of the round-robin algorithm. Indeed, the final
assignments for the his in Algorithm 4 are exactly the goods that the agents receive in line 3 of
Algorithm 3 (see also Lemma 9 in the next section).
Algorithm 3: Draft-and-Eliminate(N,M)
1 (ℓ,n′) = Preprocessing(N,M)
2 Let A = (A1, . . . ,An) with Ai = ∅ for each i ∈N
3 (A,M ′) = Round-Robin(N,A,M,ℓ,n)
4 ℓR = (ℓ[n], ℓ[n− 1], . . . , ℓ[1])
5 (A,M ′) = Round-Robin(N,A,M ′ , ℓR,n− n′)
6 A = Envy-Cycle-Elimination(N,A,M ′)
7 return A
As it is customary, we use φ to denote the golden ratio. That is, φ is the positive solution to
the quadratic equation x2−x−1 = 0. Recall that φ = 1+
√
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2 ≈ 1.618 and that φ −1 = φ−1 ≈ 0.618.
Algorithm 4: Preprocessing(N,M)
1 L = ∅; A =N ; k = 1
2 while A , ∅ do
3 Let i be the lexicographically first agent of A
4 hi = argmaxg∈M vi(g)
5 ti =m− |M |+1 /* i’s timestamp */
6 Let R =N (A∪ L∪ {i})
7 j = argmaxt∈R vi(ht)
8 if φ · vi(hi ) < vi(hj ) then
9 hi = hj
10 L = L∪ {i}
11 ℓ[k] = i
12 k = k +1
13 A = (A {i})∪ {j}
14 else
15 A = A {i}
16 M =M {hi }
17 for every i ∈N L in order of increasing timestamp ti do
18 ℓ[k] = i
19 k = k +1
20 return (ℓ, |L|)
Before we move to the analysis of our algorithm, it is useful to build some more intuition
on how things work. The preprocessing part essentially reorders N so that the first few agents
(namely, the first |L| agents) are quite happy with their pick in the first round of the round-
robin subroutine. For the remaining agents, we make sure that they get a second good before
we move to the envy-cycle-elimination algorithm. To do so in a “balanced” way, these agents
pick goods in reverse order. The resulting partial allocation, where everyone receives one or
two goods, turns out to have all the fairness properties we want to achieve at the end, e.g., it
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is (φ − 1)-efx with respect to the currently allocated goods. Crucially, we show that starting
from there and then applying the envy-cycle-elimination algorithm on the remaining instance
maintains these properties.
Coming back to the preprocessing part, the intuition is to simulate a first round of Algo-
rithm 2 and correct any occurrences of extreme envy. In particular, if an agent envies someone
that chose before her by a factor greater than φ, then she is moved to a position of high priority
in the ordering that is created. The agents moved to the first positions during this process (i.e.,
agents in L) are guaranteed a good of high value in line 3 of Algorithm 3. To counterbalance
their advantage, they are not allowed to pick a second good later in line 5.
To see that Algorithm 3 runs in polynomial time, given the properties we have seen for
Algorithms 1 and 2, it suffices to check that the preprocessing step can be efficiently imple-
mented. Indeed, the if branch of the while loop in Algorithm 4 may be executed at most n
times, since agents are irrevocably added to L. Similarly, the else branch may be executed at
most n times, as each time the set A becomes smaller and its size never increases in the other
parts of the algorithm.
4 Fairness Guarantees of Algorithm 3
We begin our analysis with two useful lemmata about Algorithm 4. We stress that within
Algorithm 4, every agent i is associated with a distinct good hi , although nothing is allocated at
this step. The first lemma establishes some useful inequalities regarding the goods associated
with the agents. The second lemma states that this association actually coincides with the
partial allocation produced in line 3 of Algorithm 3.
Recall that the set L, defined in Algorithm 4, contains the agents that get to pick first in line
3 of Algorithm 3 at the expense of not choosing a second good in line 5. In terms of Algorithm
3, L = {ℓ[1], ℓ[2], . . . , ℓ[n′]}). The partition of N into L and N L is pivotal for distinguishing the
different cases that are relevant in the analysis.
Lemma 9. At the end of the execution of Algorithm 4 with input (N,M), each agent i is associated
with a single good hi , so that
a) vi(hi) > φ · vi(g), for any i ∈ L and g ∈M ∪nk=1{hk},
b) φ · vi(hi ) ≥ vi(hj ), for any i, j ∈N L.
Proof. a) Fix some i ∈ L and consider the last iteration of the while loop where i was the lexico-
graphically first agent of A, during which i was added to L. We make the distinction between
the initial and the final good associated with i during this iteration by using holdi and hi re-
spectively to denote them. So, initially, i was associated with holdi which was her favorite good
at the time, among the available ones. Since i was eventually added to L, we know that the
condition in line 8 was true. That is, i’s favorite good among the ones associated to an agent
not in L, say hj , was more than φ times more valuable than h
old
i . By the choice of h
old
i , we have
vi(hj ) > φ · vi(holdi ) ≥ φ · vi(g) for any good g that was not associated to an agent at the time.
Note that the set of unassociated goods during the execution of the algorithm only shrinks,
and thus the last inequality also holds for any good g that was not associated to any agent till
the end. Finally, recall that hi = hj , as imposed by line 9, to conclude that vi(hi ) > φ · vi(g) for
any g ∈M ∪nk=1{hk}.
b) Fix some i, j ∈ N L. Note that both i and j may be considered multiple times during
Algorithm 4, as they may be removed and then added back to the set A several times. We
consider two cases, based on the last time that each agent was considered (i.e., the last time
each of them was the lexicographically first agent in A). If the last time that i was considered
by Algorithm 4 happened before the last time that j was considered (i.e., ti < tj at the end), the
desired inequality is straightforward, as agent i is associated with her favorite good among the
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available goods, hi , before agent j, i.e., vi(hi) ≥ vi(hj ). On the other hand, if the last time i was
considered by Algorithm 4 takes place after the last time that j was considered (i.e., ti > tj at
the end), suppose that φ · vi(hi ) < vi(hj ). Then, during the last iteration that i was considered,
line 8 would be true and i would be (irrevocably) added to L in line 10, which contradicts the
choice of i.
In order for the above lemma to be of any use, we need a connection between the his and the
partial allocations that are produced in the first part of Algorithm 3 (lines 3-5). At a first glance,
the issue is that the order in which the goods are assigned in Preprocessing(N,M) is somewhat
different than the order in which the goods are allocated in Round-Robin(N,A,M,ℓ,n). Next
we establish this connection.
Lemma 10. The partial allocation produced in line 3 of Algorithm 3 is A = ({h1}, {h2}, . . . , {hn}),
where the his are as in Lemma 9.
Proof. We start with the easy observation that the ordering ℓ that is used in the Round-Robin
subroutine in line 3 of Algorithm 3 is not the same with the order that goods get assigned to
agents during the preprocessing step, even when one takes into account that moving agents
into L is similar to changing their order.
First, using induction, we are going to show that agents in L get assigned to them (in Algo-
rithm 4) the same goods they would if they were to choose first (in Algorithm 2) according to ℓ.
For agent ℓ[1] this is straightforward, since she gets her favorite good in both cases. So, assume
for our inductive step that agents ℓ[1], . . . , ℓ[k−1] did receive goods hℓ[1], . . . ,hℓ[k−1] respectively
in Algorithm 2. We argue that agent ℓ[k]’s favorite available good from Mk = M ∪k−1i=1 {hℓ[i]}
is hℓ[k]. Indeed, in the execution of Algorithm 4, consider the last iteration of the while loop
where ℓ[k] was the lexicographically first agent of A. At the time, L was {ℓ[1], . . . , ℓ[k − 1]} and
in lines 4-9 agent ℓ[k] gets assigned hℓ[k] which is her favorite good among the ones assigned
outside L exactly because this was much better than her favorite unassigned good. That is, (the
final choice for) hℓ[k] is ℓ[k]’s favorite good fromMk . This concludes the inductive step.
Given the above, it is not hard to argue about agents in N L. First, observe that, on ter-
mination, agents in N L all have distinct timestamps assigned in line 5. Although this is not
true for all agents, an agent in N L only gets an existing timestamp, if this belongs to one or
more agents already in L. For the remainder of the proof, by timestamp of an agent i, we mean
the final value of ti . Now, fix some i ∈ N L. In Algorithm 4 agent i gets assigned her favorite
good available if we exclude the goods assigned to some agents in L, and to all the agents in
N L with timestamp less than ti (first scenario). In Algorithm 2, agent i receives her favorite
good available if we exclude the goods allocated to all the agents in L, and to all the agents in
N L with timestamp less than ti (second scenario). However, in the second scenario, the extra
agents from L that pick before i choose goods that i does not find attractive enough. Indeed,
those goods are available in the first scenario (where they are the only extra available options
compared to the second scenario), yet i does not prefer them to hi . Therefore, in the second
scenario i also picks hi and Ai = {hi } after line 3 of Algorithm 3.
Given the above, we are going to consistently use the hi notation for the goods allocated in
line 3 of Algorithm 3, throughout the remaining of this section. Further, for the agents who
receive a second good in line 5 of Algorithm 3 we use h′i to denote that second good of agent i.
As a warm-up we first obtain that Algorithm 3 maintains the fairness guarantee of its
components, i.e., ef1 fairness.
Proposition 11. Algorithm 3 returns an ef1 allocation.
Proof. Given Theorem 7, it suffices to show that the partial allocationA = (A1, . . . ,An) produced
in line 5 of Algorithm 3 is ef1. Fix two distinct agents i, j ∈ N . If j ∈ L, then Aj = {hj }. Clearly,
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj {hj }) = 0. On the other hand, if j ∈ N L, then Aj = {hj ,h′j }. Since agent i picked
hi when h
′
j was still available, vi(hi) ≥ vi(h′j ). So, we have vi(Ai ) ≥ vi(hi ) ≥ vi(Aj {hj }).
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4.1 Envy-Freeness up to Any Good
Proving whether efx allocations always exist or not seems very challenging [Plaut and Rough-
garden, 2018, Caragiannis et al., 2019]. Even improving on the 1/2 approximation factor of
Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] has been one of the most intriguing recent open problems in
fair division. In this sense, we view the following as one of the highlights of this work.
Theorem 12. The allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) returned by Algorithm 3 is a (φ − 1)-efx allocation.
Proof. Consider the allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) returned by the algorithm, and fix two distinct
agents i, j ∈N . If |Aj | = 1, then clearly, vi(Ai) ≥maxg∈Aj vi(Aj {g}) = 0. So, assume that |Aj | ≥ 2
and let h be the last good added to Aj (either in line 5 by reverse round-robin or in line 6 by
envy-cycle-elimination). Of course, at the time this happened, Aj may belonged to an agent
j ′ other than j. Finally, let Aoldi , A
old
j ′ be the bundles of i and j
′ , respectively, right before h
was allocated (i.e., h was added to Aoldj ′ ). Note that A
old
i may not necessarily be a subset of
Ai due to the possible swaps imposed by Algorithm 1, but part b) of Theorem 7 implies that
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aoldi ). We consider four cases, depending on whether i ∈ L and on the type of step
during which h was added to Aoldj ′ .
Case 1 (i ∈ L and h added in line 5). We have Aoldi = {hi }, as well as j ′ ∈ N L and Aj = {hj ′ ,h′j ′ }.
This immediately implies that vi(A
old
i ) ≥max{vi(hj ′ ),vi(h′j ′ )} and, thus, vi(Ai) ≥maxg∈Aj vi(Aj
{g}).2
Case 2 (i ∈ L and h added in line 6). By the way that envy-cycle-elimination chooses who to
give the next good to, (line 10 of Algorithm 1), we know that right before h was added, no one
envied j ′ . In particular, vi(Aoldi ) ≥ vi(Aoldj ′ ). We further have vi(Aoldi ) ≥ vi(hi ) > φ · vi(h), where
the last inequality directly follows from part a) of Lemma 9. Putting everything together,
vi(Aj ) = vi(A
old
j ′ ) + vi(h) ≤ (1 +φ−1)vi(Aoldi ) ≤ φ · vi(Ai ),
or, equivalently, vi(Ai) ≥ φ−1 · vi(Aj ) = (φ − 1)vi(Aj ).
Case 3 (i < L and h added in line 5). We have i, j ′ ∈ N L and Aj = {hj ′ ,h′j ′ }. If ℓ[i] < ℓ[j ′], then
we proceed in a way similar to Case 1. Indeed,
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aoldi ) ≥ vi(hi ) ≥max{vi(hj ′ ),vi(h′j ′ )} =max
g∈Aj
vi(Aj {g}).
So, assume that ℓ[i] > ℓ[j ′]. This, in particular, means that vi(h′i ) ≥ vi(h′j ′ ). We have
vi(Ai ) ≥ vi(Aoldi ) ≥ vi(hi ) + vi(h′i ) ≥
1
φ
vi(hj ′ ) + vi(h
′
j ′ )
≥ 1
φ
(vi(hj ′ ) + vi(h
′
j ′ )) = (φ − 1)vi(Aj ),
where the third inequality directly follows from part b) of Lemma 9.
Case 4 (i < L and h added in line 6). Arguing like in Case 2, we have vi(A
old
i ) ≥ vi(Aoldj ′ ).
Moreover, by the way round-robin works, we know that vi(hi ) ≥ vi(h′i ) ≥ vi(h). In particular,
vi(h) ≤ 12vi({hi ,h′i }) ≤ 12vi(Aoldi ). Putting things together, we have
vi(Aj ) = vi(A
old
j ′ ) + vi(h) ≤
(
1+
1
2
)
vi(A
old
i ) ≤ φ · vi(Ai).
Equivalently, vi(Ai ) ≥ (φ − 1)vi(Aj ).
It is not hard to see that our analysis is tight, i.e., there are instances (even with n = 2 and
m = 4) for which the resulting allocation is not (φ − 1+ ε)-efx for any ε > 0.
2 Here we achieve the efx objective exactly. Instead, in a similar argument as in Case 2, we could have used that
vi (hi ) > vi (hj ′ ) and vi (hi ) > φ · vi (h′j ′ ) to get vi (Ai ) ≥ (φ − 1)vi (Aj ).
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4.2 Groupwise Maximin Share Fairness
A result of Amanatidis et al. [2018] (Proposition 3.4) implies that every exact efx allocation is
also a 4/7-gmms allocation. Of course, the allocation produced by Algorithm 3 is not exact efx
and, in general, an arbitrary (φ − 1)-efx allocation need not even be a 0.404-gmms allocation
(see Appendix ??). For the particular allocation returned by Algorithm 3, however, we can
show that the gmms guarantee is significantly better. Parts of our proof closely follow the
proof of the aforementioned proposition of Amanatidis et al. [2018].
We are going to need the following simple lemma that allows to remove appropriately
chosen subsets of goods, while reducing the number of agents, so that the maximin share
of a specific agent does not decrease. In particular, the lemma implies that for any good g ,
µi(n− 1,M {g}) ≥ µi (n,M).
Lemma 13 (Amanatidis et al. [2018]). Suppose T ∈Πn(M) is an n-maximin share defining parti-
tion for agent i. Then, for any set of goods S , such that there exists some j with S ⊆ Tj , it holds that
µi(n− 1,M S) ≥ µi(n,M).
Theorem 14. The allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) returned by Algorithm 3 is a 2φ+2 -gmms allocation.
Proof. Suppose that A is not a 2φ+2 -gmms allocation, i.e., there exists a subset of agents Q ⊆N
with |Q| = q, and some agent j ∈ Q, so that vj (Aj ) < 2φ+2µj(q,R), where R = ∪k∈QAk . That is,
with respect to Q and R, the restriction of A to Q is not a 2φ+2 -mms allocation. To facilitate the
presentation, and without loss of generality, we may assume that Q = [q] and that agent 1 is
such a “dissatisfied” agent. We write µ1 instead of µ1(q,R).
We may remove any agent in Q, other than agent 1, that receives exactly one good, and still
end up with a suballocation that is not a 2φ+2 -gmms allocation. Indeed, if |Ai | = 1 for some
i ∈ Q {1}, then (A1, . . . ,Ai−1,Ai+1, . . . ,Aq) is an allocation of R Ai to Q {i} and, by Lemma 13,
µ
′
1 = µ1(q−1,R Ai ) ≥ µ1. Thus, v1(A1) < 2φ+2µ′1. Therefore, again without loss of generality, we
may assume that |Ai | ≥ 2 for all i ∈Q {1} in the initial allocationA. At this point, we make the
distinction on whether 1 ∈ L or not.
Case 1 (1 ∈ L). As we see from (the footnote of) Case 1 and from Case 2 of the proof of Theorem
12, we always have v1(A1) ≥ (φ − 1)v1(Ai ) (or equivalently v1(Ai) ≤ φv1(A1)) for all i ∈ Q {1}.
Recall that, by the definition of maximin share, µ1 ≤ 1q v1(R). Thus
qµ1 ≤ v1(R) =
∑
k∈Q
v1(Ak) ≤ qφv1(A1).
That is, we get v1(A1) ≥ (φ − 1)µ1 ≥ 2φ+2µ1, which contradicts the choices of A and A1.
Case 2 (1 < L). Consider some i ∈ Q {1} and let h be the last good added to Ai . Following the
notation introduced in the proof of Theorem 12, this bundle belonged to some agent i ′ and
Aoldi ′ denotes the bundle allocated to i
′ right before h was added. According to Cases 3 and
4 in the proof of Theorem 12, if h was added in line 5 of Algorithm 3 and ℓ[1] ≥ ℓ[i ′] or if it
was added in line 6, then v1(Ai ) ≤ φv1(A1). We still need to deal with the subcase where h
was added in line 5 but ℓ[1] < ℓ[i ′]. We call such an Ai dubious. For dubious bundles, by their
definition, we directly have |Ai | = 2 and v1(A1) ≥ v1(h1) ≥ maxg∈Ai v1(g). If a bundle Ai is not
dubious, or if it is dubious but we have v1(Ai ) ≤ 32v1(A1) < φv1(A1), we say that Ai is convenient.
A (dubious) bundle is inconvenient if it is not convenient. A good is inconvenient if it belongs
to an inconvenient bundle. Let B be the set of all inconvenient goods.
Now we are going to show that v1(A1) ≥ 2φ+2µ1(q′ ,R′) for a reduced instance that we get by
possibly removing some inconvenient goods. We do so in a way that ensures that µ1(q
′ ,R′) ≥ µ1,
thus contradicting the choices of A and A1. We consider a q-maximin share defining partition
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T for agent 1 with respect to R, i.e., minTi∈T v1(Ti) = µ1 and ∪k∈QTk = R.3 If there is a bundle of
T containing two goods of B, g1, g2, then we remove those two goods and reduce the number
of agents by one. By Lemma 13, we have that µ1(q−1,R {g1, g2}) ≥ µ1. We repeat as many times
as necessary to get a reduced instance with q′ ≤ q agents and a set of goods R′ ⊆ R for which
there is a q′-maximin share defining partition T ′ for agent 1, such that no bundle contains
more than one good from B. By repeatedly using Lemma 13, we get µ1(q
′ ,R′) ≥ µ1.
Let x be the number of goods from B in the reduced instance. Clearly, x cannot be greater
than q′, or some bundle of T ′ would contain at least 2 inconvenient goods. Further, if |B| = y,
i.e., the number of inconvenient goods in the original instance, then we know that the number
of convenient bundles in the restriction ofA onQ was q− y2 , and that the number of agents was
reduced
y−x
2 times, i.e., q
′ = q − y−x2 . That is, we can express the number of convenient bundles
in the original instance in terms of q′ and x only, as q′ − x2 .
In order to upper bound v1(R
′), notice that R′ contains all the goods of all the convenient
bundles plus x inconvenient goods. Recall that any good of a dubious bundle has value at most
v1(A1), and that if Ai is convenient then v1(Ai ) ≤ φv1(A1). So, we have
v1(R
′) ≤ xv1(A1) +
(
q′ − x
2
− 1
)
φv1(A1) + v1(A1)
= (φq′ + (1−φ/2)x− (φ − 1))v1(A1)
≤ (φ + (1−φ/2))q′v1(A1) =
φ +2
2
q′v1(A1).
Combining this inequality with µ1 ≤ µ1(q′ ,R′) (by the construction of the reduced instance)
and µ1(q
′ ,R′) ≤ 1q′ v1(R′) (by the definition of maximin share), we get v1(A1) ≥ 2φ+2µ1, which
contradicts the choices of A and A1.
A natural question to ask is why we could not achieve the factor of 4/7 of the original
proposition of Amanatidis et al. [2018] instead. A close inspection of the original proof reveals
that we need a slightly stronger upper bound for the value of the convenient bundles, i.e., a
factor of 3/2 rather than φ that we actually have here. There is no easy way to fix this in
general without other things breaking down badly in the analysis of Algorithm 3. The crucial
observation, however, is that we only need the distinction of convenient and inconvenient
bundles for agents in N L. By fine-tuning line 8 of Algorithm 4, we are able to improve
the inequalities about the convenient bundles just for agents in N L and obtain a 4/7-gmms
allocation in general, at the expense of some loss with respect to efx.
Theorem 15. Suppose we modified Algorithm 3 by changing φ in line 8 of Algorithm 4 to 3/2. Then
the resulting allocation is a 4/7-gmms allocation. It is also a 3/5-efx, a 2/3-pmms, and an ef1
allocation.
Proof. The proof for ef1 goes through as is. We only need to highlight the differences in
comparison to the proofs of Theorems 12, 16 and 14. We begin with efx and Theorem 12.
When |Aj | = 1 it is again straightforward that vi(Ai) ≥ maxg∈Aj vi(Aj {g}). In Cases 1 and 2
(using the footnote of Case 1), by substituting 2/3 for φ, we get vi(Ai) ≥ 35vi(Aj ). The first
part of Case 3 (where ℓ[i] < ℓ[j ′]) is the same, giving vi(Ai ) ≥ maxg∈Aj vi(Aj {g}), while in
the second part (where ℓ[i] > ℓ[j ′]) we get vi(Ai ) ≥ 23vi(Aj ) by using 3/2 instead of φ. Case
4 is exactly the same, giving vi(Ai) ≥ 23vi(Aj ). So, for any pair i, j of agents, we either have
vi(Ai) ≥maxg∈Aj vi(Aj {g}) or vi(Ai) ≥ 35vi(Aj ), implying that vi(Ai ) ≥ 35maxg∈Aj vi(Aj {g}).
Moving to pmms and Theorem 16, by following the same proof and using the 3/5 factor
from above instead of φ in the last couple of lines, we still get the same factor 2/3.
3 Note that while goods in B may have no apparent significance for the reduced instances and the allocations
we talk about from this point on, we keep referring to them as inconvenient.
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Finally, for gmms and Theorem 14, we may follow the same arguments with 4/7 rather
than φ/(φ + 2). For Case 1, using the inequality v1(A1) ≥ 35v1(Ai) from the efx case above, we
have v1(A1) ≥ 35µ1 ≥ 47µ1. For Case 2, the above analysis for efx implies that when 1 < L and
Ai is not dubious we have the even stronger guarantee: v1(A1) ≥ 23v1(Ai ). This directly implies
that v1(A1) ≥ 23v1(Ai ) for any convenient bundle Ai . Coming to the final argument for upper
bounding v1(R
′), we have
v1(R
′) ≤ xv1(A1) +
(
q′ − x
2
− 1
)
3
2
v1(A1) + v1(A1)
=
(
3q′
2
+
x
4
− 1
2
)
v1(A1) ≤
7
4
q′v1(A1).
Like before, we combine this inequality with µ1 ≤ µ1(q′ ,R′) and µ1(q′ ,R′) ≤ 1q′ v1(R′) to get that
v1(A1) ≥ 47µ1.
4.3 Pairwise Maximin Share Fairness
Any result for gmms directly translates to a result for pmms with the exact same guarantee.
Note, however, that the proof of Theorem 14 suggests that the bad event with respect to gmms
is having many inconvenient bundles. When we only deal with two agents at a time, it is not
hard to see that inconvenient bundles are not an issue. In fact, their existence would not be
able to force the approximation ratio for pmms below 2/3, even if the goods where divisible.
Indeed, following the cases in the proof of Theorem 12 it is relatively easy to show that this is
exactly the guarantee achieved by Algorithm 3.
Theorem 16. The allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) returned by Algorithm 3 is a 2/3-pmms allocation.
Proof. Fix two distinct agents i, j ∈ N . To show the desired approximation ratio we are going
to use the analysis in the proof of Theorem 12 and the simple inequality 2µi(2,S) ≤ vi(S) that
directly follows from Definition 4 for any subset S of goods. To simplify the notation, we use
Aij as a shorthand for Ai ∪Aj .
If |Aj | = 1, then by Lemma 13, µi(2,Aij ) ≤ µi (1,Ai) = vi(Ai ). So, assume that |Aj | ≥ 2 and
let h be the last good added to Aj . We adopt the notation of the proof of Theorem 12 here as
well. That is, we assume that right before h was added, Aj belonged to some agent j
′ . We first
examine the case where i ∈N L, h was added in line 5 of Algorithm 3 by reverse round-robin,
and ℓ[i] < ℓ[j ′]. This case is the bottleneck for achieving a better approximation factor, as the
rest of the analysis reveals. Here we know that Aj = {hj ′ ,h′j ′ } and that max{vi (hj ′ ),vi(h′j ′ )} ≤
vi(hi). Therefore,
2µi (2,Aij ) ≤ vi(Aij ) ≤ vi(Ai ) + 2vi(hi ) ≤ 3vi(Ai).
It immediately follows that vi(Ai) ≥ 23µi (2,Aij ).
For all the other cases, by examining the proof of Theorem 12, we can see that vi(Aj ) ≤
φvi(Ai). Therefore,
2µi(2,Aij ) ≤ vi(Aij ) ≤ vi(Ai) +φvi(Ai) ≤ 3vi(Ai ).
Again, it follows that vi(Ai ) ≥ 23µi(2,Aij ).
While the above factor is tight for our algorithm, it is easy to see that if we exclude the
bottleneck case in the proof of Theorem 16, then the approximation ratio goes up to 2φ+1 ≈
0.764. Hence, we could try to improve this single problematic case where both i and j ′ receive
two goods from the round-robin subroutine but j ′ has lower priority. Note that the bundles of
i and j ′ start offwell, i.e., right after line 5 of Algorithm 3 we have vi(Ai ) ≥ µi (2,Aij ′ ). The issue
is that during the envy-cycle-elimination phase, Ai might be updated to a bundle that still has
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value almost vi(hi) but can be combined with hj ′ and h
′
j ′ to produce two sets of value roughly
3
2vi(hi ). To remedy that, we can modify slightly the envy graph. The high level idea—due
to Kurokawa Kurokawa [2017]—is that an agent from N L should only exchange her initial
bundle of two goods for something significantly better.
Suppose we start with a partial allocation P = (P1, . . . ,Pn) produced in line 5 of Algorithm
3. For α > 1, the α-modified envy graph GαP is defined like the envy graph GP but we drop
any edge (i, j) where: i ∈N L, and i still has her original bundle, and α · vi(Pi) > vi(Pj ). That is,
agents in N L are represented in the envy graph as having an artificially amplified value (by
a factor of α) specifically for their original bundles.
The following theorem indicates how far we can push the approximation factor for pmms,
at the expense of ef1, while preserving the original guarantees with respect to efx and gmms.
Theorem 17. Suppose we modified Algorithm 3 by using the (φ − 12 )-adjusted envy graph in Algo-
rithm 1. Then the resulting allocation is a
4φ−2
2φ+3 -pmms and a
2
2φ−1-ef1 allocation. Moreover, the
guarantees of Theorems 12 and 14 are not affected.
Proof. First, it is easy to see the ef1 guarantee. Before running the modified envy-cycle-
elimination algorithm, the allocation is ef1. Then, whenever a new good gets allocated, it
is given to an agent that no one envies by more than a factor of
2φ−1
2 . That is, for any agents
i, j ∈N , if h is the last good given to j, then vi(Ai ) ≥ 22φ−1vi(Aj {h}).
For the other notions, we only need to highlight the differences from the proofs of Theo-
rems 12, 16 and 14. We begin with efx and Theorem 12. It is easy to see that the only step that
differs is Case 4. It is not anymore the case that vi(A
old
i ) ≥ vi(Aoldj ′ ). Instead, (φ − 12 )vi(Aoldi ) ≥
vi(A
old
j ′ ). Also, like in the original proof, we have vi(h) ≤ 12vi(Aoldi ). Putting everything together,
we have
vi(Aj ) = vi(A
old
j ′ ) + vi(h) ≤
(
φ − 1
2
+
1
2
)
vi(A
old
i ) = φ · vi(Ai ).
We conclude that we have a (φ − 1)-efx allocation.
Given the guarantee for efx, the proof of Theorem 14 for gmms goes through as is.
Finally, for pmms and Theorem 16 we may follow the same general proof except for some
details. We fix two agents i, j ∈N . Like in the proof of Theorem 16 we use Aij to denote Ai∪Aj .
If |Aj | = 1, the original argument holds, so we assume that |Aj | ≥ 2. Let h be the last good added
to Aj and assume that right before h was added, Aj belonged to some agent j
′ .
Again, we first go over the bottleneck case where i ∈ N L, h was added in line 5 of Algo-
rithm 3 by reverse round-robin, and ℓ[i] < ℓ[j ′]. Then Aj = {hj ′ ,h′j ′ } and max{vi(hj ′ ),vi(h′j ′ )} ≤
vi(hi). A vital distinction now is whether Ai is i’s original bundle from line 5 of Algorithm 3.
Suppose this is the case, i.e., Ai = {hi ,h′i } and Aij = {hi ,h′i ,hj ,h′j }. Then, hi = argmaxg∈Aij vi(g)
and it is not hard to see that vi(Ai) ≥ µi(2,Aij ) (see also Lemma 20 i) within the proof of
Theorem 18). Next, suppose Ai is not i’s original bundle. Then, for the modified envy-cycle-
elimination algorithm to give i another bundle, it must be the case that vi(Ai ) ≥ 2φ−12 vi({hi ,h′i }).
Therefore,
2µi(2,Aij ) ≤ vi(Aij ) ≤ vi(Ai) + 2vi(hi) ≤ vi(Ai ) + 2vi({hi ,h′i })
≤ vi(Ai ) +
4
2φ − 1vi(Ai) =
2φ +3
2φ − 1vi(Ai).
It follows that vi(Ai) ≥ 4φ−22φ+3µi(2,Aij ).
For all the other cases, we have that vi(Aj ) ≤ φvi(Ai). Therefore, 2µi(2,Aij ) ≤ vi(Aij ) ≤
vi(Ai) +φvi(Ai) and it follows that vi(Ai ) ≥ 2φ+1µi(2,Aij ) ≥
4φ−2
2φ+3µi(2,Aij ).
We conclude that the allocation is
4φ−2
2φ+3 -pmms.
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5 GMMS, PMMS, and EFX with a Few Goods
In this section we focus on the exact versions of the fairness notions under consideration. In
particular, we show that gmms allocations always exist whenm ≤ n+2. This implies that pmms
and efx allocations also exist for this case by the discussion in Section 2.4
As it is indicated in the proof of Theorem 18, the interesting case is when m = n+ 2 and is
tackled by Algorithm 5. When m ≤ n the problem is trivial, and the m = n + 1 case is rather
straightforward as well. Adding one extra good, however, makes things significantly more
complex. To point out how challenging these simple restricted cases can be, we note that for
the much better studied notion of mms fairness it is still open whether exact mms allocations
exist when m = n+5 [Kurokawa et al., 2018].
Quite surprisingly, the envy-cycle-elimination algorithm again comes to rescue for the case
when m = n+2. We first run the round-robin algorithm to allocate n−1 goods to the first n−1
agents. After this, we have 3 goods remaining. Allocating these goods to the last agent may
destroy the properties we are after, so we need to be careful on how to handle these three
goods. Instead, we (pretend to) pack them into two boxes; the big box (i.e., the virtual good p)
“contains” two goods and the small box (i.e., the virtual good q) “contains” one. We tell each
agent separately that the big box contains her favorite two out of the three items and give the
big box to the last agent. Then we proceed using the envy-cycle-elimination algorithm. At the
end, the owner of the big box gets her two favorite goods, while the owner of the small box
gets the remaining good.
Algorithm 5: Draft-Pack-and-Eliminate(N,M)
1 Let ℓ = (1,2, . . . ,n) and A = (∅, . . . ,∅)
2 (A,M ′) = Round-Robin(N,A,M,ℓ,n− 1)
3 Create two virtual goods p and q, such that for all i ∈N :
vi(q) = ming∈M ′ vi(g) and vi(p) = vi(M ′)− vi(q)
4 Allocate p to agent n
5 A = Envy-Cycle-Elimination(N,A, {q})
6 Give to the final owner of p her two favorite goods fromM ′ and to the final owner of q
the remaining good
7 return A
Theorem 18. For instances with m ≤ n + 2, a gmms allocation always exists and can be efficiently
computed.
Proof. When m ≤ n, we arbitrarily allocate one good to each agent, till there are no goods left,
to produce A = (A1, . . . ,An). Fix a subset S of agents, and let i ∈ N . The combined bundle
of all agents in S either contains strictly less than |S | goods or exactly |S | goods. In the first
case, we trivially have µi (|S |,∪j∈SAj ) = 0, whereas in the second case, we have µi(|S |,∪j∈SAj ) =
ming∈∪j∈SAj vi(g). In both cases, we have that vi(Ai) ≥ µi(|S |,∪j∈SAj ), and A is a gmms alloca-
tion.
For m > n, we will use the following simple observations.
Lemma 19. Let Q ⊆ N and T ⊆ M such that |T | = 2|Q| − 1. Then, for any i ∈ Q, we have
maxg∈T vi(g) ≥ µi(|Q|,T ).
Proof of Lemma 19. By the pigeonhole principle, in any possible partition of T in |Q| parts, at
least one bundle will have at most 1 good. So, in any |Q|-maximin share partition of T for an
agent i ∈Q, her worst bundle’s worth is upper bounded by maxg∈T vi(g).
4 Actually, the existence of efx allocations is directly implied by the existence of pmms allocations only when
all values are positive. However, our result is more general.
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The next one is established within the proof of Theorem 5.1 of Amanatidis et al. [2016].
Lemma 20. Let i ∈N and T = {g1, g2, g3, g4} ⊆M such that vi(g1) ≥ vi(g2) ≥ vi(g3) ≥ vi(g4). Then
i) vi({g1, g4}) ≥ µi(2,T ) , and
ii) max
{
vi(g1),vi({g2, g3})
}
≥ µi (2,T ).
When m = n + 1, let A = (∅, . . . ,∅), i.e., Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ N , and ℓ = (1,2, . . . ,n), i.e., the
standard lexicographic order. We can first run Round-Robin(N,A,M,ℓ,n) and then give the
remaining good to agent n to get the final allocation ({h1}, . . . , {hn−1}, {hn,h′n}). Consider a subset
of agents S and an agent i ∈ S . From S , we can eliminate anyone, other than i, that owns at
most 1 good, without reducing i’s maximin share. That is, vi(Ai) = µi(1,Ai ) ≥ µi(|S |,∪j∈SAj ),
where the last inequality follows after |S | − 1 applications of Lemma 13. Hence, if no agent
in S {i} got 2 goods, then we would be done. The problem then reduces to checking the case
where S consists of agents i and n. In particular, we need to show that vi(hi ) ≥ µi(2, {hi ,hn,h′n})
for all i < n. Indeed, given that vi(hi ) ≥ max{vi (hn),vi(h′n)}, this directly follows from Lemma
19. Hence, A is a gmms allocation.
Whenm = n+2, we use Algorithm 5 to compute the allocationA = (A1, . . . ,An). We consider
two cases, depending on whether A contains a bundle with 3 goods or not.
Case 1 (One agent receives 3 goods). Let ˆ be the agent for whom |Aˆ| = 3. By arguing like
before about repeatedly eliminating agents that received exactly 1 good via Lemma 13, it is
easy to see that the problem of whether vi(Ai ) ≥ µ(|S |,∪j∈SAj ), for any S ⊆ N and any i ∈ S , is
reduced to whether vi(Ai) ≥ µi(2,Ai ∪Aˆ) for any i ∈N {ˆ}.
The only way that ˆ ended up with 3 goods is if she received both p and q and Aˆ = M
′.
When q was allocated, some agent ˆ ′ (possibly other than ˆ ) had p. Given that no one envied ˆ ′
at the time and that the envy-cycle-elimination never decreases the value of an agent’s bundle
(Theorem 7 b)), for any i ∈N {ˆ} we have
vi(Ai ) ≥ vi(p) = vi(Aˆ)−min
g∈Aˆ
vi(g) = max
g∈Aˆ
vi(Aˆ {g}).
Using part ii) of Lemma 20, this implies that vi(Ai ) ≥ µi(2,Ai ∪M ′). So, in this case A is a
gmms allocation.
Case 2 (Two agents receive 2 goods each). Let ˆp be the agent who ended up with p and ˆq be
the agent who ended up with q (in addition to her other good d) after line 5 of Algorithm 5.
Clearly, these are the only agents who receive 2 goods. Further, let Aˆp = {a,b} and Aˆ2 = {c,d},
i.e.,M ′ = {a,b,c} and a,b are ˆp’s two favorite goods fromM ′.
Again, by repeatedly using Lemma 13, the problem reduces to a small number of subcases
involving at most one agent that received 1 good. Specifically, to show that A is a gmms
allocation, it suffices to show
(i) vi(Ai ) ≥ µi(2,Ai ∪Aˆp ) for any i ∈N {ˆp , ˆq}
(ii) vi(Ai ) ≥ µi(2,Ai ∪Aˆq ) for any i ∈N {ˆp , ˆq}
(iii) vi(Ai ) ≥ µi(3,Ai ∪Aˆq ∪Aˆq ) for any i ∈N {ˆp , ˆq}
(iv) vˆq (Aˆq ) ≥ µˆq (2,Aˆp ∪Aˆq )
(v) vˆp (Aˆp ) ≥ µˆp (2,Aˆp ∪Aˆq )
We first deal with subcases (i), (ii) and (iii). By how round-robin works, we know that i pre-
ferred her initial good to any good inM ′. Moreover, by how envy-cycle-elimination works, we
know that i did not envy the bundle {d} right before q was added to it and that her current
good is no worse than any good she had earlier. Thus, i’s current good is her favorite good in
Ai ∪M ′. Then (i), (ii) and (iii) all follow by Lemma 19.
We next move to subcase (iv). Like above, because of round-robin, we know that ˆq pre-
ferred her initial good to any good inM ′ and, because of envy-cycle-elimination, her good d is
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no worse than her initial good. Thus, d is ˆq’s favorite good in Aˆp ∪Aˆq . Even if c is her least
favorite good, (iv) directly follows from part i) of Lemma 20.
Finally, we consider subcase (v). If Aˆp contains ˆp’s favorite good in Aˆp ∪ Aˆq , then (v)
follows from part i) of Lemma 20. So, suppose that ˆp ’s favorite good is either c or d. By
line 6 of Algorithm 5, we know that min{vˆp (a),vˆp (b)} ≥ vˆp (c). Thus, it must be that d is ˆp’s
favorite good and that a,b are her second and third favorite goods. Moreover, ˆp did not envy
the bundle {d} right before q was added to it and {a,b} is no worse than any bundle she had
earlier. That is, vˆp ({a,b}) ≥ vˆp(d). Then (v) follows from part ii) of Lemma 20.
So, A is a gmms allocation in this case as well.
Corollary 21. When m ≤ n+2, we can efficiently find pmms and efx allocations.
Proof. For pmms this is trivial. Given that Caragiannis et al. [2016] show that each pmms
allocation is an efx allocation when all values are positive, we directly get the existence of efx
allocations for this special case. However, going through the proof of Theorem 18, it is not
hard to see that the result holds under the stronger Definition 2 b).
Fix two distinct agents i, j ∈N . As usual, if |Aj | = 1, then vi(Ai) ≥maxg∈Aj vi(Aj {g}) = 0, so
assume that |Aj | ≥ 2.
First consider the case where |Aj | = 2 and let |Aj | = {x,y}. If j is the agent who ended up with
p, then we directly have vi(Ai ) ≥ vi(hi) ≥max{vi(x),vi(y)}. So suppose j is the agent who ended
up with q = x in addition to her other good y. First, notice that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(hi ) ≥ vi(x). Because
Algorithm 1 added x to {y}, we also get that vi(Ai ) ≥ vi(y). We conclude that the allocation is
efx.
We then consider the case where |Aj | = 3. That is, j received both p and q and Aj =M ′. But
since Algorithm 1 added q to p, we have
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(p) = vi(M ′)− vi(q) = vi(Aj )−min
g∈Aj
vi(g).
Again, the allocation is efx.
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A An Example Illustrating the Different Notions
Suppose we have the following instance with three agents and five goods. It can be verified
that this instance does not admit an ef allocation.
a b c d e
Agent 1 10 6 7 5 3
Agent 2 6 8 12 7 5
Agent 3 10 11 3 2 7
Consider first the allocation A = (A1,A2,A3) = ({a,d}, {c}, {b,e}). This is not an envy-free
allocation, since v2(A2) < v2(A1). We claim, however, that it satisfies all the relaxed fairness
criteria. To see that it is efx for agent 1, we have v1(A1) = 15 and, on the other hand, v1(A2 \
{c}) = 0, v1(A3 \ {b}) = 3 and v1(A3 \ {e}) = 6. Thus, the efx condition is satisfied for agent 1
with respect to the other agents’ bundles. Similarly, we can check that for agents 2 and 3 the
corresponding conditions are satisfied.
To verify thatA ismms, pmms, andgmms, we first observe that µ1(3,M) = 10, µ2(3,M) = 12
and µ3(3,M) = 10. Hence, we have that vi(Ai ) ≥ µi(3,M) for i = 1,2,3, which establishes mms.
We can also examine the three different pairs of agents and see that the pairwise maximin
shares are attained. For example, v1(A1) ≥ µ1(A1 ∪ A2) = 10, and v1(A1) ≥ µ1(A1 ∪A3) = 11.
Hence, A is a pmms allocation. As there is no other subset of agents to examine, this means A
is also gmms.
To demonstrate the approximate versions of the fairness criteria, consider now the alloca-
tion A′ = (A′1,A′2,A′3) = ({b}, {c,e}, {a,d}). This is neither ef nor efx, but it is easy to check that
it is an ef1 allocation. We also claim that it is a 0.6-efx allocation. To see this, note that the
approximation is due to agent 1, since agents 2 and 3 do not experience any envy. Observe that
v1(A
′
1) = 0.6 ·v1(A′3\{d}) ≥ v1(A′3\{a}), and that v1(A′1) ≥ 0.6 ·v1(A′2\{e}) ≥ 0.6 ·v1(A′2\{c}). Hence,
indeed, A′ is a 0.6-efx allocation. It is also easy to verify that A′ is a 0.6-mms allocation, and
the same approximation holds for pmms and gmms. Again it suffices to see the performance
of agent 1, and we have vi(A
′
1) ≥ 0.6µ1(3,M), implying the approximation for mms. It also
holds that v1(A
′
1) = 0.6 · µ1(A′1 ∪A′3) ≥ 0.6 · µ1(A′1 ∪A′2), which determines the approximation
for pmms and gmms.
B On the Connections Between Approximate Fairness Guarantees
Here we deal with the question of whether the approximation guarantee established for one
of the considered fairness notions directly implies the approximation guarantees for the other
notions. For example, given that we obtain a (φ − 1)-efx approximation allocation, does this
immediately enforce any of the fairness guarantees that we show for ef1, pmms and gmms?
If this were true, our task would become simpler. Some of our proofs would not be necessary
and we would not have to analyze separately the approximation guarantees for all the fairness
notions.
Such questions have been studied recently by Amanatidis et al. [2018] who gave an almost
complete picture regarding the relations among the notions of ef1, efx, mms, and pmms. We
exhibit here that none of our improved approximation factors can be derived by a black-box
use of the guarantees provided in Amanatidis et al. [2018]. Hence, the separate analyses of
Algorithm 3 for each notion are necessary for obtaining our results
To begin with, suppose we have an ef1 allocation. The results in Section 3 of Amanatidis
et al. [2018] state that an arbitrary ef1 allocation cannot yield a constant factor approximation
for efx and mms—hence neither for gmms. It is also shown that every ef1 allocation is 1/2-
pmms, and this is tight, but this guarantee is weaker than what we obtain here for pmms.
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Moving on to approximate efx allocations, Proposition 3.7 in Amanatidis et al. [2018]
states that an arbitrary α-efx allocation is also a 2α2+α -pmms allocation, and this is tight. This
means that our (φ − 1)-efx approximation in Theorem 12 immediately implies only a 2(φ−1)1+φ ≈
0.472-pmms approximation, which is worse than our analysis in Theorem 16. Further, Propo-
sition 3.5 in Amanatidis et al. [2018] implies (via mms) that an arbitrary α-efx allocation is
not necessarily a max{ α1+α , 8α11+2α }-gmms allocation. For our case, this means that we cannot
obtain a better than 0.404-gmms approximation directly from Theorem 12.
Suppose now that we obtain an α-mms allocation. Proposition 4.5 and Corollary 4.9 in
Amanatidis et al. [2018] show that this cannot yield a constant factor approximation for efx
and pmms. The same then is true for gmms. In a similar manner, Proposition 4.8 in Ama-
natidis et al. [2018] shows that an α-pmms allocation cannot necessarily guarantee a constant
approximation to efx. Hence, our Theorems 16 and 17 cannot provide the guarantee we have
in Theorem 12 for efx. Finally, by Proposition 4.4 in Amanatidis et al. [2018], an approxi-
mate pmms allocation does not necessarily yield a constant approximation for mms, and thus
neither for gmms.
The only implications left to examine is when we start with an arbitrary α-gmms allocation.
Since gmms allocations were not considered by Amanatidis et al. [2018], we show here the
following result.
Proposition 22. Let α ∈ (0,1). For n ≥ 2, an α-gmms allocation is not necessarily an ( α2−α +ǫ)-ef1
or an (α + ǫ)-pmms, or a β-efx allocation for any ǫ > 0,β ∈ (0,1).
Proof. Regarding ef1, we consider the following example that generalizes the tightness exam-
ples from the proofs of Propositions 4.6 and 4.8 of Amanatidis et al. [2018]. It is an instance
with n agents and 4k +n goods for k ≥ 1. Let β ∈ (0,1). We focus on agent 1 and we have
v1(gj ) =

α
2k 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k
2−α
2k 2k +1 ≤ j ≤ 4k
0.01 4k +1 ≤ j ≤ 4k +2
2/β j = 4k +3
1 4k +3 ≤ j ≤ 4k +n
Consider A = (A1, . . . ,An) = ({g1, . . . , g2k}, {g2k+1, . . . , g4k+1}, {g4k+2, g4k+3}, {g4k+4}, . . . , {g4k+n}) and
assume that agents 2 through n are not envious. It is only a matter of simple calculations
to see that according to agent 1, this is an α-gmms allocation which is also, however, only an
α
2−α -ef1, an α-gmms and a
β
2 -efx allocation.
Plugging α = 2φ+2 in Proposition 22, we get that an arbitrary 0.553-gmms allocation is not
necessarily a 0.383-ef1 or a 0.554-pmms allocation, and has no guarantee whatsoever with
respect to efx. Hence, our Theorem 14 (or even Theorem 15 for that matter) does not imply
the guarantees we obtain for efx and pmms in Theorems 12 and 16 respectively.
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